Ground Beef Inspections and E. Coli O157:H7: Placing the Needs of the American Beef Industry Above Concerns for the Public Safety by Straw, Katherine A.
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 37 Access to Justice: Mass Incarceration and Masculinity Through a Black Feminist 
Lens 
January 2011 
Ground Beef Inspections and E. Coli O157:H7: Placing the Needs 
of the American Beef Industry Above Concerns for the Public 
Safety 
Katherine A. Straw 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Katherine A. Straw, Ground Beef Inspections and E. Coli O157:H7: Placing the Needs of the American Beef 
Industry Above Concerns for the Public Safety, 37 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 355 (2011), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol37/iss1/13 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
355 
Ground Beef Inspections and E. Coli O157:H7: 
Placing the Needs of the American Beef Industry 
Above Concerns for the Public Safety 
Katherine A. Straw  
Millions of Americans suffer from foodborne illnesses each year.
1
 
While mild cases often get shrugged off after spending a night in the 
bathroom, a small number of people suffer drastic consequences for 
liking their burgers medium rare.
2
 Consumers take for granted, and 
 
 
 J.D. (2011), Washington University School of Law; B.A. Foreign Affairs, Psychology 
(2006), University of Virginia. I would like to thank my family and friends for their never-
ending love and support, with a special thanks to my father, Charles Straw, for serving as a 
constant reminder that you can survive law school relatively intact. I am also grateful to the 
staff of the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy for their hard work and dedication 
in finalizing this Note.  
 1. Estimates range that anywhere from a few million to nearly eighty million illnesses 
are a result of foodborne pathogens each year. See, e.g., Caroline Smith DeWaal, Food Safety 
Inspections: A Call for Rational Reorganization, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 453 (1999) (thirty-
three million illnesses); Kerri E. Machado, Unfit for Human Consumption: Why American Beef 
is Making Us Sick, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 801, 811 (2003) (five million illnesses); Michael 
T. Roberts, Mandatory Recall Authority: A Sensible and Minimalist Approach to Improving 
Food Safety, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 563, 565 (2004) (seventy-six million illnesses). Estimates 
vary wildly due to varying mandatory reporting requirements among the states as well as the 
public’s failure to report mild cases of food poisoning. See generally Josefa M. Rangel et al., 
Epidemiology of Escherichia coli O157:H7 Outbreaks, United States, 1982–2002, 11 
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 603, 608 (2005). 
 2. Foodborne illnesses can be transmitted through a variety of sources. Recent publicized 
outbreaks include unpasteurized juice, spinach, and strawberries. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Ongoing Multistate Outbreak of Escherichia 
coli Serotype O157:H7 Infections Associated with Consumption of Fresh Spinach—United 
States, September 2006, 55 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1045 (2006) (spinach); 
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA, State of Maryland, and Baugher Enterprise 
Warn Consumers to Avoid Baugher’s Apple Cider (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http:// 
www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm232986.htm (juice); Teresa 
Carson, E. Coli Outbreak in Oregon Linked to Strawberries, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/08/us-strawberry-ecoli-oregon-idUSTRE7776IQ2011 
0808 (strawberries). This Note will focus on beef products, as they are the most common cause 
of both outbreaks and sporadic cases of E. coli O157:H7. Ctrs. For Disease Control, Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., Multistate Outbreak of Escherichia coli O157:H7 Infections 
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are reassured by, the presence of a “USDA inspected” sticker on their 
meat products.
3
 
The American beef industry is the largest agricultural enterprise in 
the United States, producing over twenty-five billion pounds of beef 
products and contributing more than sixty-six billion dollars annually 
to the national economy.
4
 The industry’s power extends deep into the 
political world as well.
5
 Lobbyists for the beef industry in 
Washington, D.C. spend millions of dollars to block legislation that 
would increase regulation.
6
 If passed, such legislation could reduce 
production and the industry’s economic bottom line. 
The current regulations for ground beef inspections place the 
majority of the responsibility on the beef industry to ensure that their 
products remain safe for consumption. Each processor is responsible 
for designing sanitation guidelines to limit contamination from 
occurring in the first place.
7
 Additionally, each processor must 
institute an inspection program to ensure that any products that have 
become contaminated are identified and removed.
8
 But because fast 
 
Associated With Eating Ground Beef—United States, June–July 2002, 51 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 637, 638 (2002). 
 3. All meat products determined to be unadulterated, and thus cleared for human 
consumption, must be labeled as “inspected and passed” before they are distributed. See 21 
U.S.C. §§ 606(a), 607 (2006). 
 4. Cattlemen’s Beef Bd. & Nat’l Cattlemen’s Beef Ass’n, Beef Market at a Glance, 
EXPLORE BEEF, available at http://www.explorebeef.org/CMDocs/ExploreBeef/FactSheet_ 
BeefMarketAtAGlance.pdf. Retail sales of beef products reached over fifteen billion dollars in 
2008 (last updated May 2009). Id. at 2. See also U.S. Beef and Cattle Industry: Background 
Statistics and Information, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/news/BSE 
Coverage.htm (last modified May 25, 2011). 
 5. See Machado, supra note 1, at 826–29 (naming several Republican political 
appointees with extensive ties to the beef industry who instigated various beef industry-friendly 
policies).  
 6. See THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, SAFETY LAST: THE POLITICS OF E. COLI AND 
OTHER FOOD-BORNE KILLERS 76 (1998), http://www.publicintegrity.org/assets/pdf/ 
SAFETYLAST.pdf (listing the top recipients in the Senate and House of Representatives of 
campaign contributions from the meat industry). For a listing of contributions made to federal 
candidates by political action committees within the livestock industry, broken down by 
election cycle, see Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Livestock: PAC Contributions to Federal 
Candidates, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/industry.php?txt=A06&cycle= 
2010 (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
 7. See infra note 41. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
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line speeds in production facilities remain the industry’s top priority,9 
the industry is unlikely to institute inspection procedures that would 
slow down their ability to maximize profits.
10
 
Part I of this Note reviews the history of federal regulation of the 
beef industry, discusses the particular dangers of Escherichia coli 
0157:57 (“E. coli O157:H7”) as a foodborne pathogen, outlines the 
inspection systems implemented in response to outbreaks of E. coli 
O157:H7 outbreaks, and explains current recall practices for 
potentially contaminated products. Part II analyzes the shortcomings 
of the current regulatory framework for ground beef inspections and 
the ability of the beef industry to “pass the buck” when contaminated 
beef products make their way out to the public. Part III proposes 
legislation that would grant the government the ability to mandate 
recalls of contaminated products and to fine those companies who do 
not properly inspect their products or maintain sanitary processing 
facilities. 
I. HISTORY 
A. THE FEDERAL MEAT INSPECTION ACT 
Congress first granted the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) the authority to conduct ante- and postmortem 
inspections of livestock slaughtered for meat in 1890 as a response to 
European concerns about the safety of American beef products.
11
 
 
 9. A single worker at the evisceration stage of the slaughtering process, during which the 
internal organs of the cattle are removed, may handle as many as sixty cattle an hour. ERIC 
SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 203 (2001). The larger processing facilities have the ability to 
produce up to 800,000 pounds of ground beef products in a single day. Id. at 204. 
 10. In the early 1990s, when the USDA attempted to instigate a stricter inspection system 
that integrated microbial testing, it had to allow an increase in line speeds before it was able to 
persuade several slaughterhouses to implement the new system. Machado, supra note 1, at 817–
18. The USDA then phased out this short-lived program and returned to its original inspection 
practices. Id. at 819. It did not, however, reduce line speeds back to the original slower speeds. 
Id. 
 11. Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems, 
60 Fed. Reg. 6,774, 6,775 (Feb. 3, 1995) (providing a brief history of meat inspection programs 
in the United States). In the 1880s, imports of American pork and other livestock products were 
restricted by European countries due to fears of trichinosis in pork and other animal diseases in 
livestock. MICHAEL OLLINGER & VALERIE MUELLER, USDA ECON. RESEARCH SERV., 
MANAGING FOR SAFER FOOD: THE ECONOMICS OF SANITATION AND PROCESS CONTROLS IN 
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Federal regulation of the beef industry truly began, however, in 
response to the public outcry that followed the 1906 publication of 
Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, which detailed the filthy conditions of 
the meatpacking industry.
12
 The Federal Meat Inspection Act 
(FMIA),
13
 passed within a year of The Jungle’s publication, 
established sanitary standards for slaughter and processing facilities, 
mandated ante- and postmortem inspection of all animals, and 
required slaughtering and processing plant owners to allow 
government inspectors access to their facilities.
14
  
Seeking to prevent the distribution of “adulterated”15 products 
containing fecal matter, disease, or other forms of contaminants to the 
public, the USDA placed thousands of inspectors in the field to 
conduct animal-by-animal inspections.
16
 An inspector could order the 
 
MEAT AND POULTRY PLANTS 3 (2003), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/ 
aer817/aer817c.pdf. 
 12. See Brenda Lawson, Foodborne Illness: The Cause and Effect of E. coli O157:H7 
Contamination of Our Food Supply, 4 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 71, 79 (1999). The Jungle is a 
fictional work based on the Chicago meatpacking industry’s terrible working conditions that 
took place around the turn of the twentieth century. See UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Maura 
Spiegel ed., 2003) (1906); see also Lawson, supra. 
 13. Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-242, 34 Stat. 1260 (1907) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–683 (2006)). 
 14. 21 U.S.C. §§ 603–604, 606, 608 (2006). The corresponding regulation for the poultry 
industry was not passed until the 1950s when poultry consumption substantially increased. 
Poultry Products Inspection Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441 (1957) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 451–472 (2006)). 
 15. The term “adulterated” is applied to: 
[A]ny carcass, part thereof, meat or meat food product under one or more of the 
following circumstances: (1) if it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious 
substance which may render it injurious to health, . . . (3) if it consists in whole or in 
part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance or is for any other reason unsound, 
unhealthful, unwholesome, or otherwise unfit for human food; (4) if it has been 
prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become 
contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health . . . . 
21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(1)-(4) (2006). 
 16. Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems, 
60 Fed. Reg. at 6,775. The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is the agency within the 
USDA that is currently responsible for inspecting and regulating all meat and poultry moving 
within interstate and foreign commerce. See generally Organization, Functions, and Delegations 
of Authority, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,284, 15,285 (Apr. 8, 1983) (outlining the organization and 
primary functions of the FSIS). Created by the Secretary of Agriculture as the Food Safety and 
Quality Service in 1977, it was renamed as part of a realignment of the USDA in 1981. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol37/iss1/13
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removal of any animal or carcass deemed unfit for consumption,
17
 
and if the processor failed to do so, then the inspector could take 
steps to have that facility’s inspection privileges revoked.18 Loss of 
inspection privileges effectively shuts down a meat processing 
facility because they cannot operate until the inspector returns to the 
facility.
19
  
B. E. COLI O157:H7 
E. coli is a common bacteria present in the gastrointestinal tracts 
of animals and humans.
20
 When an animal is slaughtered, the 
contents of the intestinal tract can come in contact with muscle tissue, 
thereby transferring the bacteria.
21
 Should that meat then be ground 
down, then E. coli would be blended into the final product.
22
 E. coli 
 
 17. See Sharlene W. Lassiter, From Hoof to Hamburger: The Fiction of a Safe Meat 
Supply, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 411, 458 (1997). Inspections were generally conducted by 
organoleptic methods whereby inspectors used sight, touch, and smell to detect disease or to 
otherwise determine that an animal and/or its meat was unfit for human consumption. See 
Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems, 60 Fed. 
Reg. at 6,775 (detailing the history of beef inspection in the United States and the methods 
employed). 
 18. See Lassiter, supra note 17, at 451. 
 19. See id.  
 20. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 9, at 199; CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED 
NUTRITION, BAD BUG BOOK: FOODBORNE PATHOGENIC MICROORGANISMS AND NATURAL 
TOXINS HANDBOOK, available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/FoodborneIllness/Food 
borneIllnessFoodbornePathogensNaturalToxins/BadBugBook/ucm071284.htm [hereinafter BAD 
BUG BOOK].  
 21. See Delilah Dill Schuller, Comment, Pathogen Reduction Through “HACCP” 
Systems: Is Overhaul of the Meat Inspection System All It’s Cut Out To Be?, 8 SAN JOAQUIN 
AGRIC. L. REV. 77, 81 (1998). 
 22. See id. Although the majority of E. coli O157:H7 outbreaks implicating contaminated 
beef are a result of undercooked ground beef products, there have also been product recalls 
involving whole muscle cuts of beef as a consequence of mechanical enhancement. Ashley R. 
Rosenberg, The Survivability, Growth, and Heat Susceptibility of E. coli O157:H7 in Enhanced 
Beef Brine Solutions Containing Potassium Lactate and Lactic Acid Producing Bacteria 14 
(May 2009) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Texas Tech University), available at 
http://etd.lib.ttu.edu/theses/available/etd-04032009-140740/unrestricted/Rosenberg_Ashley_Thesis 
.pdf (“Beef steaks are considered a low risk to consumers for E. coli O157:H7 infection due to 
the constitution of whole muscle cuts. The inside of muscle is considered sterile and free of 
bacteria. The surface of the steak is the only area with the potential to be contaminated . . . .”). 
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O157:H7,
23
 one of many different strains of E. coli, has proven to be 
particularly deadly.
24
  
Although other strains of E. coli can cause gastrointestinal 
illness,
25
 the toxins produced by E. coli O157:H7 can cause 
hemorrhagic colitis
26
 and can lead to hemolytic uremic syndrome 
(HUS).
27
 HUS occurs in two to seven percent of E. coli O157:H7 
infections and primarily affects children.
28
 In addition to the more 
severe health complications that may arise from inadvertent 
consumption of E. coli O157:H7, the bacteria is particularly 
dangerous because of its hearty nature and its ability to infect with 
very few organisms.
29
 
 
 23. The combination of letters and numbers refers to markers on the surface of the 
bacteria which distinguish E. coli O157:H7 from other strains of E. coli. Denis Stearns, 
Preempting Food Safety: An Examination of USDA Rulemaking and Its E. Coli O157:H7 
Policy in Light of Estate of Kriefall ex rel. Kriefall v. Excel Corporation, 1 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 
375, 381–82 (2005). 
 24. See Schuller, supra note 21, at 18. The O157:H7 strain of E. coli is deadlier than 
others due to its ability to produce Shiga-like toxins, which can cause extensive damage to the 
intestine and may enter the bloodstream and damage the kidneys as well. BAD BUG BOOK, 
supra note 20; Machado, supra note 1, at 811; see also Thomas G. Boyce et al., Escherichia 
Coli O157:H7 and the Hemolytic-Uremic Syndrome, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 364, 365–66 
(1995) (describing the clinical manifestations of E. coli O157:H7 infections). 
 25. Mild cases of E. coli infections are often misattributed to the “stomach flu” and are 
never reported, likely because they can pass in a few hours. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 9, at 
202; see also Paul S. Mead et al., Food Related Illnesses and Death in the United States, 5 
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 607, 611 (1999) (table providing estimates of illnesses, 
hospitalizations, and deaths caused by known foodborne pathogens, including several different 
types of E. coli). 
 26. See Stearns, supra note 23, at 384. Hemorrhagic colitis is typically “characterized by 
severe abdominal cramps, bloody stool, but sometimes little or no fever.” Id.; see also 
Machado, supra note 1, at 811. 
 27. See Machado, supra note 1, at 811. “HUS [hemolytic uremic syndrome] can cause 
kidney failure, anemia, internal bleeding, destruction of vital organs, neurological damage, 
seizures and strokes.” Id. HUS is the cause of the majority of acute illnesses and deaths 
resulting from E. coli O157:H7 infections. Stearns, supra note 23, at 385. 
 28. Stearns, supra note 23, at 385. Among children suffering from HUS, approximately 
half will require dialysis. Id. at 385. The mortality rate for children who develop HUS is five to 
ten percent. Id. at 386 n.57; see also Chinyu Su & Lawrence J. Brandt, Escherichia coli 
O157:H7 Infection in Humans, 123 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 698, 700–01 (1995) (discussing the 
prevalence of HUS in children resulting from E. coli O157:H7 infections). 
 29. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 9, at 201. E. coli O157:H7 can survive on kitchen surfaces 
for days and in moister environments for weeks, and has the ability to withstand temperatures 
up to 160 degrees Fahrenheit. Id.; see also S.A. Wilks et al., The Survival of Escherichia coli 
O157 on a Range of Metal Surfaces, 105 INT’L J. OF FOOD MICROBIOLOGY 445, 451 (2005) 
(noting that E. coli O157 was able to survive for more than 28 days on stainless steel surfaces in 
both refrigerated and room temperature environments). Furthermore, whereas it can take the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol37/iss1/13
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Although E. coli O157:H7 was first identified as a pathogen in 
1982,
30
 it took an outbreak
31
 of over 500 infections of HUS and four 
deaths from late 1992 into early 1993 for Congress to significantly 
overhaul the federal food safety regulations.
32
 In 1994, the USDA 
began by labeling E. coli O157:H7 as an adulterant under FMIA,
33
 
making it the only bacteria labeled as such to date.
34
 The beef 
industry quickly objected to this new classification on the grounds 
that E. coli was not injurious to health unless the product containing 
the bacteria was improperly cooked.
35
 This challenge proved 
 
consumption of up to a million organisms of some foodborne pathogens to cause an infection, 
E. coli O157:H7 can cause an infection with very few organisms. See id. (as few as five 
organisms); Stearns, supra note 23, at 387 (as few as twenty organisms). 
 30. Su & Brandt, supra note 28, at 698 (describing the initial discovery of the bacteria and 
subsequent epidemiology). This identification was a result of an investigation following an 
outbreak of gastrointestinal illness from hamburger consumption at a fast food restaurant. Id.; 
see also Lee W. Riley et al., Hemorrhagic Colitis Associated with a Rare Escherichia coli 
Serotype, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 681 (1983). 
 31. This outbreak is typically referred to as the “Jack-in-the-Box outbreak.” See, e.g., 
Lawson, supra note 12, at 74 (“[I]t was the December 1992 Jack-in-the-Box outbreak that first 
caught public attention.”); Stearns, supra note 23, at 390 (“The Jack in the Box outbreak was 
notable in many respects.”). Although victims became ill after consuming hamburgers at 
various Jack in the Box locations, the hamburger patties were later determined to have become 
contaminated during processing. See Beth P. Bell et al., A Multistate Outbreak of Escherichia 
coli O157:H7-Associated Bloody Diarrhea and Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome from 
Hamburgers: The Washington Experience, 272 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1349, 1352 (1994) (noting 
that a large portion of patties produced on one day were determined to be contaminated by a 
single strain of E. coli O157:H7). 
 32. See Stearns, supra note 23, at 390–91 (explaining the policies announced by the 
USDA shortly after the outbreak). 
 33. Id. at 392. The FSIS did not publish this classification in the Federal Register. Id. 
Rather, the FSIS Administrator simply announced in a speech before the American Meat 
Institute (AMI) that beef containing E. coli O157:H7 would be considered adulterated under the 
FMIA. Id. 
 34. Lawson, supra note 12, at 81. The FSIS announced a new testing program for ground 
beef where samples testing positive for E. coli O157:H7 would be labeled “adulterated” under 
the FMIA. Stearns, supra note 23, at 393. This left unanswered the question of whether intact 
beef containing E. coli O157:H7 would be “adulterated” as well. Id.  
 35. See Carole Sugarman, What’s in the Beef? USDA to Start Sampling Ground Meat to 
Monitor Contamination, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1994, at Z16 (noting that the AMI argued that 
the testing program would give consumers a “false assurance that they no longer have to 
thoroughly cook ground beef”). The meat industry also objected to the process through which 
the USDA announced and implemented enforcement of this new classification arguing that the 
Agency acted outside its statutory authority by failing to follow the APA-required notice-and-
comment procedure. See Texas Indus. Food Ass’n v. Espy, 870 F. Supp. 143, 145–46 (W.D. 
Tex. 1994).  
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unsuccessful,
36
 and E. coli O157:H7 remains an adulterant.
37
 The 
USDA then undertook the first major modernization of the inspection 
system since the passage of FMIA in 1906.
38
 
C. SHIFT TO HACCP INSPECTION SYSTEMS 
The USDA began by requiring the use of Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Points (HACCP) systems, which incorporate 
scientific analysis into determining whether food products are 
contaminated.
39
 These regulations shifted the approach from 
 
 36. See 870 F. Supp. 143. The court rejected this argument, observing that “a product is 
‘adulterated’ if ‘it . . . contains any . . . substance which may render it injurious to health.’ . . .” 
Id. at 148 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(1)) (emphasis in original). The court noted that: 
[E]vidence . . . indicates that many Americans consider ground beef to be properly 
cooked rare, medium rare, or medium. The evidence also indicated that E. Coli 
contaminated ground beef cooked in such a manner may cause serious physical 
problems, including death. Therefore, E. Coli is a substance that renders “injurious to 
health” what many Americans believe to be properly cooked ground beef. 
Id. at 149. 
 37. The USDA recently expanded its definition of “adulterant” to include six additional E. 
coli serogroups. Food Safety & Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Takes New Steps 
to Fight E. Coli, Protect the Food Supply (Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://www.usda 
.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2011/09/0400.xml. Beginning 
March 5, 2012, FSIS will begin testing for E. coli serogroups O26, O103, O45, O111, O121, 
and O145, in addition to O157:H7, as these serogroups can also cause serious illness and death. 
Id.  
 38. Two earlier legislative efforts, the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 
81 Stat. 584 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 601 (2006)), and the Wholesome Poultry Products Act of 
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-492, 82 Stat. 791 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 451 (2006)), were enacted as 
amendments to FMIA and PPIA, but served primarily to create uniformity in the regulation of 
meat and poultry products. See Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
(HACCP) Systems, 60 Fed. Reg. 6,774, 6,776 (Feb. 3, 1995). 
 39. HACCP was first developed by the Pillsbury Company as a means of assuring food 
safety in zero gravity for the U.S. space program. Theodore C. Cronk, The Historic Evolution of 
HACCP: Better Questions, Safer Foods, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 485, 485 (1994). The USDA 
announced four objectives in applying the HACCP program to meat inspection: 
(1) require that each [slaughtering] establishment develop and implement written 
sanitation standard operating procedures . . . ; (2) require regular microbial testing by 
slaughter establishments to verify the adequacy of the establishments' process controls 
for the prevention and removal of fecal contamination and associated bacteria; (3) 
establish pathogen reduction performance standards for Salmonella that slaughter 
establishments and establishments producing raw ground products must meet; and (4) 
require that all meat and poultry establishments develop and implement a system of 
preventive controls designed to improve the safety of their products, known as 
HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points). 
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“command-and-control,” in which the government inspector is 
responsible for production decisions, to one where the primary 
responsibility is on the slaughtering and processing facilities to 
ensure that their products remained unadulterated.
40
 Under HACCP 
programs, a meat processing facility must identify the food 
production that are most vulnerable to contamination, and then must 
design safety procedures at these critical points.
41
 In addition, 
processors are required to develop sanitation standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) to complement the HACCP requirements.
42
  
 
Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 38,806 (July 25, 1996). 
 40. See Stearns, supra note 23, at 394. The government’s role in food safety would shift 
“from inspection to verification.” Cronk, supra note 39, at 489. 
 41. The Final Rule instituting the use of HACCP systems, promulgated by the FSIS in 
1996, outlined the seven general principles underlying the system: 
(1) A hazard analysis of each process during meat production must be conducted to 
identify and list the food safety hazards likely to occur, and to determine the 
preventative measures necessary to control such hazards. 
(2) The critical control points (CCPs) of each process, at which control can be applied 
and the potential food safety hazard can be prevented, eliminated, or reduced to an 
acceptable level, must be identified. 
(3) Critical limits for the preventative measures related to the CCPs must be identified. 
These critical limits are often based on process parameters including temperature, 
time, moisture level, or survival of target pathogens. 
(4) Monitoring requirements for the CCPs must be established. While the FSIS prefers 
continuous monitoring, the frequencies at which the CCPS are monitored are up to the 
individual processors. 
(5) Corrective actions must be established for when monitoring indicates that there are 
deviations from the critical limits at any of the CCPs. 
(6) A recordkeeping procedure must be developed and maintained for the entire 
HACCP system. 
(7) HACCP systems must be regularly verified. This includes both an initial validation 
that the system works properly and periodic verification once the system is 
operational.  
Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems, 61 Fed. 
Reg. at 38,814-38,817 (codified at 9 C.F.R. §§ 417.1–.8 (2009)). While individual processors 
are responsible for developing and instituting HACCP systems in their facilities, the FSIS will 
be involved to a limited extent in the verification process. Id. 
 42. See 9 C.F.R. § 416 (2009). The Sanitation SOPs are intended to prevent insanitary 
practices that could “create an environment conducive to contamination of products.” Pathogen 
Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. 
38,814, 38,829 (codified at 9 C.F.R. § 416). The Sanitation SOPs include “daily preoperational 
and operational sanitation procedures that the establishment would implement to prevent direct 
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HACCP systems reduce the role of FSIS inspectors.
43
 Rather than 
ensure a safe meat supply, inspectors primarily review processors’ 
documentation of HACCP compliance
44
 and have no active role in 
the inspection of carcasses.
45
 Although the beef industry continues to 
grow, the number of FSIS inspectors has decreased,
46
 further 
diminishing their ability to ensure that the beef products entering the 
consumer marketplace are safe.
47
 
Each HACCP procedure consists of a recordkeeping component 
and a review and observation component.
48
 FSIS inspectors can use 
either of these components to verify the facility’s compliance with 
the HACCP regulations, opting to either assess the facility’s 
paperwork or to observe facility workers on the facility floor.
49
 
Slaughter facilities are also required to test for generic E. coli at 
 
product contamination or adulteration.” Id. at 38,830. In addition to Sanitation SOPs covering 
all equipment and surfaces that could directly contact products, each facility must also maintain 
Sanitation Performance Standards (SPS). FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC., FSIS DIRECTIVE 5000.1 REVISION 3, 4 (2008), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov 
/OPPDE/rdad/FSISDirectives/5000.1Rev3.pdf [hereinafter FSIS DIRECTIVE 5000.1]. “The SPS 
regulations cover all of the other aspects of plant sanitation that can affect food safety, e.g., pest 
control, adequate ventilation and lighting, and plumbing systems.” Id.; see also 9 C.F.R 
§ 4.16(2)-(6). 
 43. See CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 6, at 63. Among FSIS inspectors, the 
HACCP system received the nickname “Have a Cup of Coffee and Pray.” Id.  
 44. In a survey of FSIS inspectors working in facilities operating under the HACCP 
guidelines, 379 inspectors responded that “they spend five times as much time checking 
company records under HACCP as they did under the former system and about one-third of the 
time spent under the former system actually inspecting the meat and poultry products to protect 
consumers.” FELICIA NESTOR & WENONAH HAUTER, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE JUNGLE 2000: IS 
AMERICA’S MEAT FIT TO EAT? 5–6 (Sept. 2000), available at http://www.whistleblower.org 
/storage/documents/the_jungle.pdf.  
 45. As one meat inspector described it, “we’re paper pushers now . . . . We have to spend 
so much of our time trying to check [the plant’s] documentation that we really don’t have time 
to look at the product anymore. We’re checking papers, not products.” CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY, supra note 6, at 68 (quoting a federal meat inspector and president of a local meat 
inspectors’ union).  
 46. From 1981 to 2007, the number of full-time FSIS employees decreased from 9,932 to 
9,184. Federal Meat Inspectors Spread Thin as Recalls Rise, OMB WATCH (Mar. 4, 2008) 
http://www.ombwatch.org/node/3624. Adding to their inability to carry out proper inspections, 
the FSIS inspection force maintains a vacancy rate of approximately ten percent. Id. 
 47. As of 2007, the FSIS employed less than eighty-eight people per billion pounds of 
meat and poultry inspected, down fifty-four percent from the one hundred ninety workers per 
billion pounds in 1981. Id. 
 48. FSIS DIRECTIVE 5000.1, supra note 42, at 31. 
 49. Id. 
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specific steps during the slaughter process in proportion to the 
facility’s volume of production.50 In addition to conducting these 
tests, facilities must also comply with any FSIS request to test a 
random sample for E. coli O157:H7 under the HACCP program.
51
 
Facilities generally receive sampling requests between one to four 
times per thirty-day period.
52
 
Ground meat products provide additional complications in 
ensuring that the ultimate product remains unadulterated. 
Slaughtering facilities inspect individual animals and carcasses 
according to their HACCP plan for disease or other signs that the 
meat will be unsafe for consumption.
53
 Grinding facilities, however, 
often receive the meat they process from numerous slaughterhouses.
54
 
Although the grinders are required to test their own final products,
55
 
they typically do not conduct bacterial testing on the individual 
shipments of the meat trimmings and other ingredients as these 
shipments are received.
56
 Therefore, when contaminated ground beef 
 
 50. 9 C.F.R. § 310.25 (2009). In cattle processing facilities, one in every three hundred 
carcasses must be tested, with a minimum of one sample per week of operation. Id. No sample 
may exceed 100 CFU/cm2, and where more than three samples within the last thirteen samples 
test positive, FSIS may intervene. Id. CFU/cm2 indicates the number of viable bacteria 
(“colony-forming units” or CFU) within the area in which the sample was taken. 
 51. FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FSIS DIRECTIVE 10,010.1, 
REVISION 3 (2010), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FSISDirectives/10010 
.1Rev3.pdf [hereinafter FSIS DIRECTIVE 10,010.1]. 
 52. Id. at 17–18. 
 53. If an inspector condemns a carcass due to adulteration, he or she may detain it and 
ensure the facility destroys the carcass properly, or under certain circumstances may permit the 
facility to remove the adulterated portions of the carcass. See 9 C.F.R. § 311 (2009) (disposal of 
diseased or otherwise adulterated carcasses and parts); 9 C.F.R. § 314 (2009) (handling and 
disposal of condemned or other inedible products at official establishments). Slaughtering 
facilities that merely portion beef product, but do not grind it or form patties, are not required to 
submit to random testing for E. coli O157:H7. FSIS DIRECTIVE 10,010.1, supra note 51, at 17. 
 54. See Gregory L. Armstrong et al., Emerging Foodborne Pathogens: Escherichia coli 
O157:H7 as a Model of Entry of a New Pathogen into the Food Supply of the Developed World, 
18 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVIEWS 29, 44 (1996) (“Methods currently used to produce ground beef 
make it possible for meat from dozens or even hundreds of cattle to go into any given 
hamburger patty.”). Grocery stores that package and sell their own ground beef often receive 
coarse ground beef from grinding facilities and then regrind it with trimmings and leftover meat 
cuts, further obscuring the source of contaminated meat products. See id. at 44–45.  
 55. See 9 C.F.R. § 302.1 (requiring “establishments . . . in which any products . . . derived 
from carcasses of livestock are . . . prepared for transportation or sale as articles of commerce, 
which are intended for use as human food” to participate in federal inspection programs).  
 56. See Michael Moss, E. Coli Path Shows Flaws in Beef Inspection, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 
2009, at A1 (explaining that many large slaughterhouses will not sell their products to 
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products cause an outbreak of foodborne illnesses, it can be very 
difficult to trace the tainted product back to one particular facility.
57
 It 
also makes it more difficult for victims of foodborne illness outbreaks 
to recover damages from the source of the tainted beef product.
58
 
With the task of ensuring product safety placed predominately in 
the hands of the meat industry, the FSIS limits its compliance 
enforcement to follow-up sampling at facilities where product has 
tested positive for E. coli O157:H7.
59
 If a slaughter facility fails 
microbial testing numerous times,
60
 then the FSIS can suspend 
 
processors if those customers test individual shipments of meat for E. coli prior to grinding due 
to a fear that of positive tests will lead to government repercussions). While the USDA 
encourages processors to inspect shipments of ingredients prior to grinding, each facility 
designs its own safety plan. Id. However, if any sample from a processing facility tests positive 
for E. coli O157:H7, that facility must provide the names and contact information for any 
supplying establishments to the FSIS, along with supplier lot number, production date, and any 
other information that may be useful to identify the source of the contaminated material. FSIS 
DIRECTIVE 10,010.1, supra note 51, at 36. If any supplier uses source materials from a foreign 
company, then that supplier must provide additional identifying information, including the 
country of origin and importing establishment. FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T 
OF AGRIC., FSIS NOTICE 58-10 (2010), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad 
/FSISNotices/58-10.pdf [hereinafter FSIS NOTICE 58-10]. 
 57. For an example of the difficulties in tracing the original source of contamination in a 
ground beef product, consider the case of Stephanie Smith, who contracted hemolytic uremic 
syndrome and was ultimately paralyzed as a result of eating hamburgers contaminated with E. 
coli O157:H7. See Moss, supra note 56. While the hamburger patty Smith consumed was 
ground and formed in a plant in Wisconsin, it included various cuts of beef and trimmings from 
slaughterhouses and other processing facilities in Nebraska, South Dakota, Texas, and Uruguay. 
Id. Although the outbreak led to extensive inspections by the USDA around the country, 
inspectors were unable to trace the contamination to a particular supplier. See id. 
 58. See Machado, supra note 1, at 823. One proposed solution to this problem is to 
impose collective liability on the beef industry defendants, as permitted in recent handgun 
litigation. Id. 
 59. See FSIS DIRECTIVE 10.010.1, supra note 51, at 31. FSIS compliance enforcement 
focuses on conducting follow-up sampling at facilities that have supplied trimmings or other 
product that tested positive, concentrating in particular on establishments that have had multiple 
positive test results within the previous 120 days. Id. When conducting follow-up testing, FSIS 
will collect up to sixteen samples from the establishment, ordering additional samples as 
necessary until all follow-up samples test negative. See FSIS DIRECTIVE 10,010.1, supra note 
51, at 42–44. The FSIS used to follow a “three strike” rule whereby it could suspend inspection 
services at slaughter facilities that failed microbial testing three times. Thomas O. McGarity, 
Federal Regulation of Mad Cow Disease Risks, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 289, 318 (2005). 
 60. Salmonella testing was the first method used by FSIS inspectors as a general way to 
determine compliance with HACCP pathogen reduction standards; tests for E. coli were not 
conducted to determine compliance with sanitation SOPs. See McGarity, supra note 59, at 317–
18 (outlining the HACCP program and its performance criteria). However, the beef industry 
successfully challenged the regulation of Salmonella as a proxy for all microbial contaminants, 
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inspection services, thereby preventing the facility from producing 
meat.
61
 In order to suspend inspection privileges, however, the FSIS 
must seek judicial intervention.
62
 Because there are still a number of 
administrative hurdles to suspending inspection privileges, the FSIS 
rarely reaches this level of sanction.
63
 
D. RECALLS 
Should contaminated meat make its way into the marketplace, the 
FSIS lacks the authority to mandate a recall.
64
 In response to an 
outbreak of foodborne illness, the FSIS may initiate an investigation 
to determine the necessity of a recall.
65
 If a recall is necessary, then 
the FSIS may convene its Recall Committee to evaluate the situation 
and determine the scope of a potential recall.
66
 It will then 
 
arguing that the FSIS could not regulate a characteristic of the raw materials used in creating 
ground meat products. Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. USDA, 275 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that the USDA could not use Salmonella tests conducted on a grinding facility’s final 
product to determine whether the facility was infected with § 601(m)(1) adulterant pathogens).  
 61. Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems, 
61 Fed. Reg. at 38,849; Lassiter, supra note 17, at 453; see also 9 C.F.R. § 500.6 (2009) (listing 
the circumstances under which the FSIS may withdraw inspection). 
 62. See 9 C.F.R. § 329.7. Before inspection privileges are suspended the facility is given 
an opportunity to resolve their sanitation problems. See Lassiter, supra note 17, at 450. Should 
those steps prove unsuccessful, or should the facility not cooperate with federal inspectors, an 
evidentiary administrative hearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge. See id. at 451; 
see also 9 C.F.R. §§ 500.2–500.6 (2009).  
 63. The FSIS Administrator can file a complaint to withdraw its grant of inspection for a 
variety of violations, including producing and shipping an adulterated product or failing to 
provide and maintain a HACCP program. 9 C.F.R. § 500.6 (2009). There is then a formal 
adjudication process through which these complaints must go. See generally 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.131–
1.151 (2009). Summaries of the recent administrative actions taken by the FSIS can be found in 
its Quarterly Enforcement Reports, with actions to refuse or withdraw inspection found in Table 
12. See Food Safety & Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., FSIS Adjudications, http://www 
.fsis.usda.gov/FOIA/FSIS_Adjudications/index.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). 
 64. See McGarity, supra note 59, at 378. While the USDA will assist in the administration 
of any voluntary recall, meat processing companies retain the right to decline a request to recall 
their products should they not wish to expel the effort and costs of conducting one. See id. at 
379; see also Roberts, supra note 1, at 566–71 (describing the voluntary food recall system). 
See generally FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FSIS DIRECTIVE 
8080.1, REVISION 6 (2010), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FSISDirectives/ 
8080.1.pdf [hereinafter FSIS DIRECTIVE 8080.1] (describing the procedures involving the 
voluntary recall of FSIS-inspected meat and poultry products). 
 65. See Roberts, supra note 1, at 568. 
 66. Id. at 568–69. Factors considered in determining the scope of a recall include the 
“plant’s processing and sanitation procedures, the definition of a lot, or specific grouping, and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
368 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 37:355 
 
 
recommend a recall and negotiate with the meat company in question 
to initiate a voluntary recall.
67
  
If the company chooses to conduct a recall, then the FSIS will 
issue either a press release, a recall notification report (RNR), or 
both.
68
 These notifications provide the public with a description of 
the product, any identifying marks or codes, the reason for the recall, 
general information about the product’s destination, and contact 
information for the recalling company for use by consumers and the 
media.
69
 
The FSIS classifies all recalls based on the potential threat of 
severe illness or injury to the public.
70
 Class I recalls involve 
situations in which “there is a reasonable probability that the use of 
the product will cause serious, adverse health consequences or 
death.”71 Class II recalls involve situations in which there is a 
 
whether there is any finished product reincorporated into fresh product (rework).” FSIS 
DIRECTIVE 8080.1, supra note 64, at 3.  
 67. See FSIS DIRECTIVE 8080.1, supra note 64, at 10–11 (describing the recall process). 
Most companies will cooperate with the FSIS in initiating a product recall in an effort to avoid 
the negative impact that an outbreak of foodborne illness traced to their products will have on 
public relations and the economic bottom line. See McGarity, supra note 58, at 378–79. 
 68. FSIS DIRECTIVE 8080.1, supra note 64, at 11–13. The FSIS will issue press releases to 
media outlets in the areas in which the potentially contaminated product was distributed. Id. at 
12. These press releases are also available through an email listserv to which the public can 
subscribe. See FSIS Food Recalls, FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/fact_sheets/fsis_food_recalls/Index.asp (last modified Mar. 17, 2006). 
Both the press release and the RNR are posted on the FSIS website. Id. Once a recall has been 
completed, the notice is moved from current recalls to an online archive dating back to 1994. 
See Recall Case Archive, FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/FSIS_Recalls/Recall_Case_Archive/index.asp (last modified Aug. 12, 
2011) (providing a pull-down menu to review all recalls, organized by year). The archive 
records provide the establishment and product type, other information including the nature of 
the defect leading to the recall, and the number of pounds of product recovered during the 
recall. Id. 
 69. FSIS DIRECTIVE 8080.1, supra note 66, at 12–13. Press releases provide information 
regarding any health risks caused from consumption of the product and how explain how one 
should handle and dispose of the product should they have already purchased it. See id. at 12. 
 70. See id. at 2–3. 
 71. Id. at 2. The presence of E. coli O157:H7 in the product at issue would result in a 
Class I recall. For example, in 2010, due to possible E. coli O157:H7 contamination, there were 
ten Class I recalls of beef products, totaling nearly 2.25 million pounds. See FSIS Current 
Recalls & Alerts, FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www 
.fsis.usda.gov/Fsis_Recalls/Open_Federal_Cases/index.asp (last modified Oct. 7, 2011); FSIS 
Recall Case Archive, supra note 68 (choose 2010 from pulldown bar). An additional 4.9 million 
pounds of beef and veal products were recalled due to the processing facility’s failure to follow 
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“remote probability” that use of the product could cause adverse 
health consequences.
72
 Class III recalls involve products that will not 
cause adverse health consequences.
73
 The classification level of a 
recall determines the level of notification that the FSIS will 
undertake; press releases are issued for most Class I and Class II 
recalls, and only for Class III if there are overriding public welfare 
reasons.
74
 
Recalls will be “closed” at the recommendation of the Recall 
Management Staff, who provides a summary of the recall efforts by 
the company in question and any reports findings from effectiveness 
and product disposition checks.
75
 A recall cannot be closed if there 
are any current illnesses associated with the recalled product.
76
 Once 
the FSIS is satisfied that the recall is complete, it will relocate the 
case file from the “open” to “archived” section of the FSIS website.77 
The FSIS conducts no post-recall follow-up with the recalling 
company, but recommends that the company follow up with its 
affected customers and assess the performance of its recall plan.
78
 
 
its HACCP plan; the products were recalled over fears of contamination. See News Release, 
Food Safety & Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., California Firm Expands Recall of Beef 
Products Due to Possible Adulteration (Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_ 
Events/Recall_004_2010_Expanded/index.asp. The seven 2010 recalls completed as of October 
10, 2011, resulted in approximately 150,000 pounds of recovered product. See FSIS Recall 
Case Archive, supra note 68. 
 72. FSIS DIRECTIVE 8080.1, supra note 66, at 2–3. Class II recalls include the presence of 
a very small amounts of undeclared allergens or foreign materials that are small and without 
sharp edges. Id.  
 73. Id. at 3. The presence of a non-allergen that is generally recognized as safe will result 
in a Class III recall. Id. 
 74. See id. at 12–13. Public notice of Class III recalls is usually limited to an RNR on the 
FSIS website. Id. Press releases may not be issued for Class I and Class II recalls if the 
potentially contaminated product has not been shipped beyond the wholesale level and is not 
likely to have been sold to consumers. Id. 
 75. Id. at 20. The FSIS conducts effectiveness checks to ensure that the recalling company 
has been diligent in notifying its purchasers of the need to recover and dispose of the potentially 
contaminated product. Id. at 15–16. If distribution of the product was limited to the wholesale 
level and the recalling company has regained control over the product, the FSIS will verify that 
the recalling company has properly disposed of the recalled product. Id. at 16.  
 76. Id. at 20. 
 77. Id. at 20–21. 
 78. Id. at 19–20. 
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E. CONSUMER RELIANCE  
While the FSIS assists producers with a recall when contaminated 
meat products are distributed, there is still an underlying reliance on 
the public as the last line of defense in protecting against foodborne 
illnesses.
79
 Pathogens present in ground beef are destroyed so long as 
consumers cook the product to a sufficient internal temperature.
80
 
Proper preparation and cooking are especially important with E. coli 
O157:H7 contaminated beef because the bacteria can survive at 
higher temperatures than other pathogens that cause foodborne 
 
 79. The beef industry relied in part on this argument in contesting liability for the death of 
a young girl who ate food contaminated by contact with beef tainted by E. coli O157:H7, 
contending that:  
The uniform national standards governing the production of raw meat expressly 
provide that whole-intact meat containing E. coli may be distributed for consumption 
in interstate commerce. This is because, although pathogenic bacteria (such as E. coli) 
occurs naturally in the production of meat (and is virtually impossible to avoid), safe 
food-handling readily destroy[s] the bacteria. Instead of requiring meat producers to do 
the impossible (by completely eliminating the pathogenic bacteria), the federal 
government relies on the end-user to follow safe food-handling practices to avoid the 
dangers associated with raw meat. 
Stearns, supra note 23, at 405 (quoting Excel Corporation's Notice of Motion, Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and Memorandum of Law in Support of Summary Judgment at i-ii, In re 
Consolidated E. coli O157:H7 Cases, No. 00-CV-006503 (Milwaukee Cir. Ct. May 15, 2002)). 
The court disagreed with this argument, noting that the FSIS has stressed the need for 
processors to consider what would happen if a tainted product from their facility made its way 
to the public: “the health effects of enteric pathogens are relatively well documented. If the 
pathogens enter the food supply, they do, under certain conditions, cause foodborne illness. If 
their presence can be prevented, no amount of temperature abuse, mishandling or undercooking 
can lead to foodborne illness.” Estate of Kriefall ex rel. Kriefall v. Sizzler USA Franchise, Inc., 
665 N.W.2d 417, 432 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,962). 
 80. Both the USDA and the beef industry provide information about proper cooking on 
their websites, including recommendations to cook ground beef products to an internal 
temperature of 160 degrees Fahrenheit. See Food Safety Education: Is It Done Yet?, FOOD 
SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.fsis.usda.gov/is_it_done_yet 
/Thermometer_Placement_and_Temps/index.asp (last modified May 26, 2011) (USDA 
recommendation); Cattlemen’s Beef Board & Nat’l Cattlemen’s Beef Ass’n, Commitment to 
Safety from the Industry and for Those Who Cook Beef, EXPLORE BEEF, http://www.Explore 
beef.org/safety.aspx (last visited Aug. 26, 2011) (beef industry recommendation). Rare burgers 
have an internal temperature closer to 130 degrees Fahrenheit. See RALSTON ET AL., CONSUMER 
FOOD SAFETY BEHAVIOR: A CASE STUDY IN HAMBURGER COOKING AND ORDERING 19–20 
(2002), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer804/aer804f.pdf (using internal 
temperatures of 130, 145, and 155 degrees Fahrenheit to correspond to rare, medium-rare, and 
well-done, respectively, in an analysis of consumer hamburger preparation behavior). 
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illnesses.
81
 The internal temperature recommended by the USDA to 
avoid foodborne illness will produce a burger considered “well done” 
by most standards.
82
 While many restaurants adhere to the USDA 
temperature recommendations when cooking their food,
83
 the at-
home consumer is more likely to cook to their personal preference 
without considering potential health consequences.
84
 
The USDA requires that all ground beef products shipped in 
interstate commerce contain labels indicating that they have been 
“inspected and passed.”85 Various criteria for the font and formatting 
of these labels are set by the Secretary of the USDA to avoid false or 
misleading labeling.
86
 In the past, the USDA attempted to add 
additional labels to ground beef products in order to warn consumers 
about the potential presence of harmful bacteria.
87
 The beef industry 
 
 81. Compare Foodborne Illness: What Consumers Need to Know, United States Dep’t of 
Agric., Food Safety & Inspection Serv., http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Fact_Sheets/Foodborne_ 
Illness_What_Consumers_Need_to_Know/index.asp (last modified May 24, 2011) (instructing 
consumers to cook ground beef to a minimum internal temperature of one hundred sixty 
degrees Fahrenheit in order to kill E. coli) with Robert Angelotti et al., Time-Temperature 
Effects on Salmonellae and Staphylococci in Foods, 9 APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY 308 (1961) 
(finding that one hundred percent of Salmonella organisms were killed in three different types 
of food if cooked at 140 degrees Fahrenheit for a sufficient period of time).  
 82. See RALSTON ET AL., supra note 80, at 19–20. 
 83. Restaurants are typically subject to state or local regulations that dictate minimum 
cooking times and temperatures, which often mirror or are close to USDA suggestions. See, 
e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64E-11.004 (2011) (requiring that comminuted meat products, 
including hamburger, be cooked to a minimum internal temperature of 155 degrees Fahrenheit 
for at least 15 seconds); 7 PA. CODE § 46.361 (2011) (dictating minimum cooking times and 
temperatures for cooking raw animal-derived foods in retail food establishments). 
 84. See RALSTON ET AL., supra note 80, for an analysis of consumers’ preference for 
palatability over safety and the resulting likelihood of cooking a burger medium-rare or rare.  
 85. 21 U.S.C. § 607 (2006). This label is affixed to all products determined to be 
unadulterated. 21 U.S.C. § 606 (2006). 
 86. See 21 U.S.C. § 607 (2006); 9 C.F.R. §§ 312, 316–317 (2009). In part, these 
regulations were in response to objections from consumer groups that the labeling practices 
permitted by the USDA could be misleading and deceptive. See Fed’n of Homemakers v. 
Hardin, 328 F. Supp. 181 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (finding the use of the label “all meat” on products 
containing up to fifteen percent nonmeat ingredients to be misleading and in violation of the 
Wholesome Meat Act); see also Taco Bell Meat: Chain Sued Over 35% Beef Content in ‘Taco 
Meat Filling’ [UPDATED], HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2011/01/25/taco-bell-beef-lawsuit_n_813185.html (reporting on lawsuit alleging that fast-
food chain’s meat mixture did “not meet the minimum requirements set by the [USDA] to be 
labeled as ‘beef’”). 
 87. See Stearns, supra note 23, at 419 (explaining the USDA’s effort to include the 
recommended cooking temperature for ground beef on warning labels after the Jack-in-the-Box 
outbreak). 
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has vehemently challenged additional warnings.
88
 For example, 
following the Jack in the Box outbreak, the USDA sought to place 
safe-handling labels on all packages of raw meat and poultry, which 
were to include information regarding the cooking temperatures 
necessary to kill pathogens.
89
 The beef industry, however, obtained 
an injunction against use of these safe-handling labels, and the USDA 
ultimately implemented labels that did not refer to cooking 
temperatures.
90
 
II. ANALYSIS 
The current regulatory regime for ground beef products provides 
little incentive for processing facilities to ensure that the products 
they send into the marketplace are safe. When cows are raised in one 
state, slaughtered in another, processed in a third state along with 
products from numerous other states and/or countries, and ultimately 
cooked and consumed by the public in perhaps yet a fourth state, it is 
easy for meat grinders to shift the blame to their suppliers for 
contaminated products.
91
 Furthermore, the reliance on the consumer 
to properly cook meat products so as to kill any pathogens present at 
the time of purchase as the last line of defense undermines the 
necessity for legislation designed to ensure that the meat is safe as is 
when purchased.
92
 Despite focusing on the importance of consumer 
responsibility, the beef industry has interfered with USDA attempts 
 
 88. See id. 
 89. See Mandatory Safe Handling Statements on Labeling of Raw Meat and Poultry 
Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,478 (Aug. 16, 1993). The parameters of safe handling included “how 
to safely store raw product and thaw frozen product; how to avoid cross-contamination during 
preparation; how to cook for optimal safety and palatability; and, how to store leftovers after 
preparation.” Id. at 43,483. 
 90. Texas Food Indus. Ass’n v. USDA, 842 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Tex. 1993). The USDA 
sought to implement the use of these new labels on an expedited basis, circumventing the 
normal notice and comment requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 258. 
The court objected, noting that “[i]f ‘immediate action’ was necessary, the USDA should have 
implemented, or attempted to implement, the interim rule ‘immediately.’” Id. 
 91. See McGarity, supra note 59, at 341–42. 
 92. While the Jack-in-the-Box outbreak was ongoing, the meat industry focused on 
improper cooking as the source of the problem. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 9, at 207 (“This 
recent outbreak sheds light on a nationwide problem: inconsistent information about proper 
cooking temperatures for hamburger.” (quoting J. Patrick Boyle, President, American Meat 
Institute)).  
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to require labels detailing proper cooking temperatures on all ground 
beef products.
93
 
Although E. coli O157:H7 has been identified as an adulterant by 
the USDA, the USDA does not require that a grinding facility 
specifically test for that pathogen as part of the HACCP plan.
94
 While 
microscopic testing is a part of any HACCP system, a facility can test 
for other bacteria as a way of determining whether fecal matter or 
other contaminants are present.
95
 The regulation of pathogens under 
HACCP systems does not extend, however, to “characteristics of the 
raw materials that exist before the meat product is ‘prepared, packed 
or held.’”96 Grinding facilities, therefore, do not have to test 
ingredients as they receive them from slaughterhouses and other 
processing facilities. Furthermore, FSIS sampling takes a secondary 
role to a facility’s ability to fulfill its orders for customers; should a 
randomly scheduled sampling interfere with the facility’s ability to 
produce sufficient product to complete an order, the FSIS cannot take 
its sample.
97
 
With their role limited primarily to reviewing paperwork, FSIS 
inspectors are largely ineffective. Processing facilities are not 
required to provide FSIS inspectors with complete access to the 
facility’s records; but only with the documentation relating to the 
facility’s HACCP program.98 Though there have been reports of 
 
 93. See Texas Food Indus. Ass’n, 842 F. Supp. 254. (signaling the beef industry’s 
successful fight against the USDA’s attempt to place warning labels providing minimum 
cooking temperatures for food safety on ground beef products); see also Am. Pub. Health Ass’n 
v. Butz, 511 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that the USDA need not mandate warning 
labels with proper handling techniques and cooking temperatures on meat and poultry). 
 94. See 9 C.F.R. § 310.25 (2009). Slaughtering facilities, and not those that only process 
meat, are required to test for generic E. coli at specific locations on the carcass. See id.  
 95. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 9, at 215. 
 96. Supreme Beef Processors Inc. v. USDA, 275 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 97. See FSIS DIRECTIVE 10,010.1, supra note 51, at 18. The FSIS randomly selects the 
days and times from which facilities must sample their products and report their results. See id. 
at 13–16. While it is possible that two samples could be requested from one facility on the same 
day, the FSIS cannot take both samples if doing so would prevent that establishment from 
completing customer orders, or if the facility’s inspection personnel’s workload does not permit 
such sampling frequency. Id. at 18. 
 98. Facilities are not required to provide “copies of HACCP plans, verification 
documents, or day-to-day operating records to FSIS.” Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis 
and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems, 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,821. At the largest 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
374 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 37:355 
 
 
extensive falsification of this HACCP compliance documentation,
99
 
FSIS inspectors have little time to witness the effectiveness of 
HACCP systems in person.
100
 Furthermore, most HACCP 
documentation of plant conditions is not available under the Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA),
101
 so the public must take the processing 
facilities at their word that they are complying with their own 
HACCP procedures.
102
 When it suspects a facility’s HACCP system 
is not functioning properly, the FSIS has the ability to “copy 
appropriate portions of establishment records . . . for further 
evaluation and possible enforcement action,” but those records may 
be further redacted before the public can access them.
103
 
The inability to mandate recalls of potentially contaminated 
products ties the hands of the USDA when faced with life-threatening 
outbreaks of foodborne illnesses.
104
 A meat processing company must 
voluntarily conduct a recall, and many will drag their feet in order to 
limit its scope.
105
 The longer a product is in the marketplace, the more 
 
establishments, those producing more than 250,000 pounds of ground beef per day, the FSIS 
will request sampling reports only up to four times each calendar month. See FSIS DIRECTIVE 
10,010.1, supra note 51, at 18. 
 99. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 9, at 216.  
 100. The USDA is currently understaffed with about 7,800 meat inspectors in the field; in 
the 1970s, prior to the first known E. coli outbreak, the USDA had over 12,000 inspectors. 
Slaughter Inspection 101, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD & SAFETY INSPECTION 
SERV., http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Fact_Sheets/Slaughter_Inspection_101/index.asp (last modified 
Apr. 6, 2010); see also SCHLOSSER, supra note 9, at 215. When inspectors do make facility 
inspections, some slaughterhouse workers do whatever is necessary to distract the inspector, 
including putting the “pretty talkative woman” next to him. Victoria Kim, Cattle Inspections 
Thwarted, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/20/local /me-beef20. 
Some inspectors have reported that they receive tremendous pressure to not slow down the line 
speeds at production facilities. SCHLOSSER, supra note 9, at 215.  
 101. See Machado, supra note 1, at 821; SCHLOSSER, supra note 9, at 215.  
 102. HACCP records are arguably trade secrets which are exempted from the FSIS’s 
compliance with FOIA. See FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FSIS 
DIRECTIVE 1450.1, REVISION 3, 11 (2007), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/1450-1 
rev3.pdf; Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Pont (HACCP) Systems, 
61 Fed. Reg. at 38,821. However, the FSIS must have access to all testing results that could 
disclose the existence of problems with a facility’s HACCP program. FOOD SAFETY & 
INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FSIS DIRECTIVE 5000.2, REVISION 2, 5 (2008), 
available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FSISDirectives/5000.2Rev2.pdf. 
 103. Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems, 
61 Fed. Reg. at 38,821. The FSIS views portions of HACCP plans as falling under the FOIA 
disclosure exemption for trade secrets and confidential, commercially valuable information. Id. 
 104. See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text. 
 105. See McGarity, supra note 60, at 379. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol37/iss1/13
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  Ground Beef Inspections and E. Coli O157:H7 375 
 
 
likely it will have been consumed by the time the recall is 
effectuated.
106
 The fewer products ultimately available for recall, the 
lower the costs to the company responsible for the recall.
107
  
Numerous bills seeking to provide the USDA with the power to 
mandate recalls have been voted down or have failed to make it out 
of committee.
108
 Opponents of these bills argue that mandatory recall 
authority harms the cooperative nature of the relationship between 
the recalling company and the government during the voluntary recall 
process.
109
 
Furthermore, when a company does choose to initiate a recall, the 
USDA has no legal obligation to inform the public or health officials 
in the region from which the product was distributed that a recall is 
being conducted.
110
 From 1996 to 1999, the USDA notified the public 
of only half of the Class I recalls undertaken.
111
 And when the USDA 
does announce a recall, it is often limited to publishing a notice on its 
 
 106. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 1, at 572–73. In what was at the time the largest meat 
recall ever conducted, Hudson Foods sought to recall twenty-five million pounds of beef 
products in 1997. Id. at 573. The recall began much smaller, at twenty thousand pounds, and 
was only increased once Hudson disclosed that it “reworked” leftover meat into hamburger on a 
rolling daily basis. Id. at 572–73. Following this delay in identifying potentially contaminated 
product, only eight to ten million pounds were ultimately recovered. CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, 
supra note 6, at 51. 
 107. Most of the expenses surrounding a recall are borne by the slaughterhouse or 
processing facility that handled the contaminated product. McGarity, supra note 60, at 379. The 
FSIS only bears the costs of issuing press releases and informing the public, as well as follow-
up inspections of the facilities that were subject to the recall. Id. 
 108. See, e.g., Food Safety and Tracking Improvement Act, S. 425, 111th Cong. (2009); 
Safe and Fair Enforcement and Recall for Meat, Poultry, and Food Act of 2009, H.R. 815, 
111th Cong. (2009); Unsafe Meat and Poultry Recall Act, S. 1527, 111th Cong. (2009); Food 
Safety Enhancement Act of 1997, S. 1264, 105th Cong. (1997); Family Food Protection Act of 
1995, H.R. 1423, 104th Cong. (1995); The Pathogen Reduction Act of 1994, S. 2453, 103d 
Cong. (1994). The Food Safety Modernization Act of 2009, H.R. 875, 111th Cong., which 
recently failed to be signed into law, would have granted mandatory recall authority to the 
FDA, but it did not address the recall authority of the USDA.  
 109. See Roberts, supra note 1, at 570–71. These opponents believe that a mandatory recall 
system would result in an adversarial system rife with litigation and blame shifting. Id.  
 110. See Machado, supra note 1, at 823–24.  
 111. Id. at 823. The FSIS categorizes recalls into three categories based on relative health 
risk: Class I, in which there is a reasonable probability that eating the product will cause health 
problems or death; Class II, in which there is a remote probability that eating the product will 
result in adverse health consequences; and Class III, in which eating the product will not cause 
adverse health consequences. See FSIS Food Recalls, supra note 68. 
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website.
112
 It may provide the identification number of the 
establishment that produced the product in question and regions 
through which it was distributed,
113
 but only in limited circumstances 
will the USDA identify specific locations at which the product was 
sold.
114
  
III. PROPOSAL 
The USDA needs greater enforcement ability in order to ensure 
that the ground beef supply remains safe for the public. The inability 
to order a recall allows meat processing companies to minimize cost 
at the expense of public safety.
115
 The lack of financial penalties if 
contaminated meat products harm the public further reduces 
companies’ incentives to maintain stringent sanitation SOPs and 
inspection procedures. 
Congress should grant the USDA express authority to mandate a 
recall to stop the distribution of adulterated products. Such power 
should be a backup, however, after first giving the company in 
question the opportunity to voluntarily recall its products. If the 
company is slow to initiate the recall, or refuses to do so, then the 
USDA should then have the power to step in and order the recall. In 
making mandatory recall authority a secondary option to a voluntary 
recall, the USDA can both protect the cooperative nature of the 
relationship with the beef industry that encourages prompt action in 
the face of contaminated product distribution and give the USDA the 
 
 112. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. The FSIS issues press releases for all 
Class I and Class II recalls, and RNRs for Class III recalls. See supra note 74 and 
accompanying text.  
 113. In providing recall guidelines for firms, the FSIS requires that the press release 
“provide general information about the product’s destination.” FSIS DIRECTIVE 8080.1, supra 
note 64, at 12. This can be limited to the identification of the states in which the product was 
distributed. See id. 
 114. The beef industry argues that the identities of its customers constitute “trade secrets” 
and should thus remain confidential in the face of a recall. SCHLOSSER, supra note 9, at 213. 
The FSIS will only provide retail sales locations in Class I recalls. See FSIS Current Recalls & 
Alerts, supra note 71. In the case of chain grocers, however, it may only identify the states in 
which the product may have been distributed to that particular chain. Id. 
 115. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
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teeth to enforce compliance should a company be reluctant to initiate 
a recall.
116
 
Further, the USDA should have the ability to impose strict fines 
for violations of food safety regulations. The current procedure of 
ongoing follow-up sampling at facilities that have tested positive for 
E. coli O157:H7 allows company practices that may be public health 
hazards to continue for far too long. The assessment of penalties on a 
daily basis for as long as a violation continues would serve as a 
strong incentive for companies to correct problems immediately. 
Industry arguments against many of the proposed regulations tend to 
focus on the financial impact of these regulations on small 
establishments.
117
 However, a progressive system in which fines are 
levied in relation to the total production levels of a particular facility, 
would reduce the burden that a fine would impose on smaller meat 
processors.  
Another cost-efficient USDA regulation would be spot testing. 
Requiring grinding facilities to inspect each shipment of ingredients 
they receive prior to incorporating them into a final product would be 
prohibitively expensive for most facilities to implement
118
 and would 
receive intense opposition from the beef industry. However, spot 
testing of a percentage of all ingredients, in proportion to that 
facility’s overall output, would allow for faster identification of 
contaminated products, and would prevent them from making it into 
a final ground product that then enters the marketplace. 
 
 116. See id. 
 117. For example, when the USDA proposed the shift to the HACCP system of 
inspections, it faced intense opposition from meat and poultry trade associations. Dion Casey, 
Agency Capture: The USDA’s Struggle to Pass Food Safety Regulations, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 142, 150 (1998). They argued that the costs of implementing the program would force 
eighty-five percent of small establishments out of business within one year. Id.  
 118. When first implementing the HACCP systems, FSIS estimated that it would cost small 
establishments eight thousand dollars per year to test one sample a day for microbial pathogens. 
Casey, supra note 117, at 150. If a small facility received its ingredients from numerous 
suppliers and were thus required to incur testing costs for each shipment, the cost to produce 
each pound of meat could reach unaffordable levels to keep these facilities in business. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The regulation of inspections of ground beef products continues to 
be a balancing act with the interests of the politically and financially 
powerful American beef industry against preserving the health and 
safety of consumers. However, it is ineffective to rely solely on the 
beef industry to take the necessary steps to render its products as safe 
as possible when its primary concern is profit margins. The USDA 
lacks the ability to adequately examine the sanitation and monitoring 
procedures of all facilities
119
 and when a contaminated product makes 
its way into the marketplace, the USDA must count on the producer 
to undertake a recall. Granting greater compliance enforcement 
authority to the USDA to mandate recalls and to fine violating 
facilities will better ensure that the beef industry holds itself to higher 
standards. 
 
 119. When the FSIS is able to conduct inspections, contamination can be discovered before 
it becomes a major health issue. Huntington Meat Packing, Inc. recently undertook a Class I 
recall of nearly 5.7 million pounds of beef products that may be contaminated with E. coli 
O157:H7 after a Food Safety Assessment (FSA) by FSIS personnel uncovered potential 
contamination. News Release, Food Safety & Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., California 
Firm Recalls Beef Products Due to Possible E. coli O157:H7 Contamination (Jan. 18, 2010), 
available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_004_2010_Release/index.asp. 
No illnesses have been reported. News Release, Food Safety & Inspection Serv., U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., California Firm Expands Recall of Beef Products Due to Possible Adulteration (Feb. 12, 
2010), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_004_2010_Expanded/ 
index.asp. 
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